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Review, Risk, Legality and Damages
PaulCraig*
Case C-221/10 P,Artegodan GmbH v European Commission and FederalRepublic of
Germany'

1. Introduction
This case represents the latest stage in a legal saga
that spans a decade. Some background is therefore
necessary to understand the legal argumentation in
the instant case.
Artegodan is the holder of a marketing authorization for Tenuate Retard, a medicinal product, which
contains amfepramone, an amphetamine-like anorectic substance. There was however a re-evaluation of
amfepramone at the request of a Member State, and
this led the Commission to adopt the contested decision on the basis of Article 15a of Directive 75/3 19.2
This Directive established a system of mutual
recognition, whereby an authorization granted in one
Member State had to be recognized in other Member
States. There were however not surprisingly qualifications to this regime, and it was open to a Member
State pursuant to Article 15a to press for the withdrawal of the authorization on the ground of public
health concerns. The schema was for the Member
State to refer the matter to the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, CPMP, although it was open
to the Member State in cases of urgency to suspend
authorization of the product in its territory pending
this final decision. The CPMP issued a reasoned opin-

ion which would be forwarded by the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products to
the Member States, the Commission and the person
responsible for placing the medicinal product on the
market, with a report describing the assessment of the
medicinal product and stating the reasons for its conclusions.' It was then for the Commission, within 30
days of receipt of the CPMP's opinion, to prepare a
draft decision. Where exceptionally the draft decision
was not in accordance with the opinion of the EMA
it was incumbent on the Commission to provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for the differences.
The Commission decision ordered the Member
States to withdraw the national marketing authorizations for amfepramone, in reliance on scientific conclusions attached to the CPMP's final opinion in August 1999. This was challenged by Artegodan, which
argued, inter alia, that the Commission lacked competence and that the decision infringed Directive
65/65.s The GC annulled the contested decision in
2002 on the ground that the Commission lacked competence, and held moreover that even if the Commission had competence the decision infringed Article
11 of Directive 65/65.6 The GC's decision was upheld
on appeal. The ECJ held that the Commission lacked
competence to adopt the contested decision, but did
not rule on the other arguments concerning Direc-

tive 65/65.'
*
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Professor of English Law, St John's College, Oxford.
Judgment 19 April 2012, Third Chamber, n.y.r.
Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC of20 May 1975 on the
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action relating to medicinal products [1975] OJ
L147/13.
Directive 75/319/EEC, Art. 13.
Directive 75/319/EEC, Art. 14.
Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to medicinal products [1965-66] OJ English
Special Edition p. 24.
Joined Cases T74/00, T76/00, T83/00 to T85/00, T132/00,
T137/00 and T141/00, Artegodan and Others v Commission
[2002] ECR 11-4945.
Case C-39/03 P, Commission v Artegodan and Others [2003] ECR
1-7885.
Case T-429/05, Artegodan v Commission [2010] ECR 11-491.

Artegodan then sought damages for the losses it
had suffered in the three year period that the product
had been withdrawn from the market while the legal
proceedings contesting the legality of the withdrawal
were being heard. The Commission rejected the claim
in 2004, arguing that the conditions for non-contractual liability were not met, because there was no suf
ficiently serious breach of EU law. Artegodan then began proceedings in 2005 seeking damages, but the GC
dismissed the action under what is now Article 340
TFEU, on the ground that the applicant had not established a sufficiently serious breach of EU law.8
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It held that the Commission's lack of competence
and infringement of Article 11 of Directive 65/65
were accepted by the GC in 2002 and the ECJ in 2003
and therefore should be regarded as established. The
fact that the ECJ in 2003 did not consider it necessary to examine the plea alleging breach of Article 11
of Directive 65/65 by the GC in 2002 was said to be
irrelevant. The GC nonetheless concluded that the
conditions for non-contractual liability were not met.
It held that the rules contained in Directive 75/319
delimiting the areas of competence of the Commission and the Member States were not intended to
confer rights on individuals, but were rather intended to organize the division of powers between the national authorities and the Commission, as regards the
procedure for the mutual recognition of national
marketing authorizations.
It held moreover that the infringement of Article
11 of Directive 65/65 did not constitute a sufficiently
serious breach for the purposes of damages liability.
The GC decided that Article 11 did not confer any
meaningful discretion on the Commission in the application of the substantive criteria for suspension or
withdrawal of a marketing authorization.' It nonetheless concluded that infringement of Article 11 did not
suffice to show a sufficiently serious breach for the
EU to incur liability. This was because the EU courts
had to take into account the legal and factual complexity of the situation to be regulated, notwithstanding the fact that Article 11 accorded priority to the
protection of public health. Thus while the GC was
clear that the error regarding Article 11 warranted annulment of the withdrawal of the authorization, it was
necessary in adjudicating damages liability 'to take into account the particular difficulties to which the interpretation and application of that article give rise in
this case'. 10 The GC continued in the following vein.''
Having regard to the lack of precision of Article 11
of Directive 65/65, the difficulties related to the systematic interpretation of the conditions for withdrawal or suspension of a marketing authorization
laid down by that article in the light of the whole
Community system for the prior authorization of
medicinal products (Artegodan v Commission
paragraphs 187 to 195) could reasonably explain,
in the absence of any similar precedent, the error
of law committed by the Commission in accepting
the legal relevance of the new scientific criterion
applied by the CPMP, even though it was not supported by any new scientific data or information.
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The GC reinforced this conclusion by adverting to the
nature of the decision-making in this area. The practical reality was that the CPMP made the assessment,
this was accepted by the EMA and the Commission
then made the formal decision in the light of this recommendation. If the Commission were to disagree
with the recommendation it had to provide detailed
reasons. The GC felt that it would in any event have
been very difficult for the Commission to acquaint itself with the scientific reasoning that informed the
CPMP's conclusions. This reinforced the legal and factual complexity in the instant case and meant that the
Commission's error did not amount to a sufficiently
serious breach for the purpose of damages liability.1 2

11. The CJEU
1. Division of competence, protection of
individual rights and sufficiently
serious breach
Artegodan not surprisingly contested the finding of
the GC that the rules on the division of competence
between the Commission and the Member States resulting from Directive 75/319 were not of such a kind
as to cause the EU to incur non-contractual liability
on the ground that they were not intended to confer
rights on individuals. It contended that such rules
did confer rights on individuals in circumstances
where exercise of the relevant power could lead, as
in this case, to restrictive measures being taken
against undertakings.
The CJEU upheld Artegodan's argument, although
its judgment is nonetheless unclear in certain respects. The Court held that failure to observe the division of powers between the EU institutions, where
the aim is to ensure that the balance between the institutions provided in the Treaties is maintained, and
not to protect individuals, does not suffice per se to
render the EU liable towards the traders concerned.

9

Article 11 of Directive 65/65 provides that: 'The competent
authorities of the Member States shall suspend or revoke [a
marketing authorization] where that product proves to be harmful
in the normal conditions of use, or where its therapeutic efficacy
is lacking, or where its qualitative and quantitative composition is
not as declared. Therapeutic efficacy is lacking when it is established that therapeutic results cannot be obtained with the medicinal product.'
10 Case 429/05, para. 108.
11 Case 429/05, para. 108.
12 Case 429/05, paras. 109-111.
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However the position was different if a measure of
the EU was adopted that not only disregarded the division of powers between the institutions 'but also,
in its substantive provisions, disregarded a superior
rule of law protecting individuals'."
The CJEU concluded that the GC made an error of
law by holding that infringement by the Commission
of the rules governing the division of competences
between the Commission and the Member States resulting from Directive 75/319 was not of such a kind
as to cause the EU to incur non-contractual liability
on the ground that those rules are not intended to
confer rights on individuals, because the GC had not
taken into account the point of principle in the previous paragraph, 'according to which such an infringement, when it is accompanied by an infringement of a substantive provision which has such an
intention, is capable of giving rise to that liability'.14
The CJEU does not, however, identify the superior of law for the protection of the individual that was
disregarded in the instant case. This part of the judgment is therefore somewhat Delphic. There has to be
something in addition to the infringement of the
rules relating to the division of power between the
institutions that can qualify as the superior rule of
law. It may be that the CJEU regarded the GC as having committed an error of law simply because it did
not investigate this possibility, without the CJEU itself reaching any conclusion as to what such a superior rule of law might be. The alternative reading of
the judgment is that the superior rule of law might
have been Article 11 of Directive 65/65, although the
difficulty with this reading is that the CJEU held ultimately that the Article had not been infringed.

2. Infringement of Article 11 of Directive
65/65, discretion and sufficiently
serious breach
Artegodan also contested the GC's reasoning concerning Article 11 of Directive 65/65, more especial-

13 Case C-221/10 P, para. 81, relying on Case C-228/90, Industrieen Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v Commission [1992]
ECR 1-1937, paras. 20-22.
14 Case C-221 10 P, para. 82.
15 Case C-39/03 P.
16 Case C-221/10 P, para. 86.
17 Case C-221 10 P, para. 87.
18 Case C-221 10 P, para. 92.
19 Case C-221 10 P, para. 93.
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ly its refusal to find that the breach of this Article
constituted a sufficiently serious breach of EU law.
It argued, inter alia, that the complexity of a legal or
factual situation should not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that there is an absence of any sufficiently serious breach.
The CJEU's consideration of this aspect of the appeal was rendered more complex by the fact that discussion of damages liability was interwoven with
the issue of whether the ECJ in

2003"

had pro-

nounced on Article 11 of Directive 65/65. The CJEU
reiterated the importance of res judicata in EU law,
regarding it as important to ensure stability of the
law, and the sound administration of justice: 'judicial decisions which have become definitive after all
rights of appeal have been exhausted, or after expiry
of the time-limits provided to exercise those rights,
can no longer be called into question'.1 6 However res
judicata extended 'only to the matters of fact and
law actually or necessarily settled by the judicial decision in question'." The legal reality was that the
ECJ's 2003
ruling was premised on the
Commission's lack of competence, and the ECJ did
not, as noted earlier, rule on the Article 11 issue. The
CJEU therefore concluded that the Article 11 issue
had not yet been addressed and that the 2003 ruling
was only res judicata in relation to the competence
issue." Insofar as the GC in the case under appeal
had found that the Article 11 issue had been deter
mined and was thus res judicata, it had made an er
ror of law."
The hopes of success that Artegodan might have
harboured at this point were however to prove short
lived, because the CJEU drew on the principle that
if the GC erred in law the decision could nonetheless be upheld if the operative part of the decision
could be shown to be well founded on other legal
grounds.
This was held to be so here. Article 11 of Directive
65/65 was intended to confer rights on undertakings
which held a marketing authorization. It was
nonetheless still necessary for the applicant to show
a sufficiently serious breach of the substantive criteria for the withdrawal of a marketing authorization in Article 11. It was open to the Commission to
take a long term view of whether a medicinal product lacked therapeutic efficacy. It was equally open
to the Commission when undertaking the benefit/risk assessment that would inform the long term
view to take account of views within the medical

402 | Case Notes

EJRR 3|2013

community. The CJEU concluded in the following
vein.2 0
In the present case, the Commission's decision to
use the criterion of long-term efficacy in order to
assess the therapeutic efficacy of amfepramone in
the treatment of obesity and to withdraw the mar
keting authorization concerning the medicinal
products containing that substance is based on the
existence of a consensus within the medical community regarding a new assessment criterion of
that therapeutic efficacy, according to which an ef
fective therapy in the treatment of obesity must
be for the long-term, on the questioning of the ther
apeutic efficacy of that substance, and also on the
finding, in the light of that new assessment criterion, of a negative benefit/risk assessment of that
substance.
It followed said the CJEU that the Commission did
not fail to comply with the substantive criteria for
the withdrawal of a marketing authorization of a
medicinal product laid down in Article 11 of Directive 65/65."1 There had been no breach of Article

11

and hence there was no sufficiently serious breach
for the purposes of damages liability." It followed also that the errors of law committed by the GC were
not such as to invalidate the contested judgment, given that the conclusion could be justified on the
grounds specified above.

Ill. Conclusion
Artegodanis a difficult case, primarily because of the
admixture of legal issues that came before the CJEU,
more especially the conjunction of discourse concerning the application of the sufficiently serious
breach test with that concerning res judicata. There
are two issues that should be highlighted by way of
conclusion, which are related albeit distinct.

in this respect, and the hurdle may be especially dif
ficult to surmount in relation to the types of case that
arise in the context of risk regulation. It may be felt
that the EU courts were harsh on the claimant insofar they held that even though Article 11 of Directive
65/65 did not entail meaningful discretion the legal
and factual complexity surrounding its application
meant that the applicant had not proven the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law for
the purposes of damages liability. The temptation to
reach this conclusion should nonetheless be resisted
for the following reason.
It is clear that Article 11 was mandatory, since it
provides that the competent authorities of the Member States shall suspend or revoke a marketing authorization where the product proves to be harmful in
the normal conditions of use, or where its therapeutic efficacy is lacking, or where its qualitative and
quantitative composition is not as declared. Article 11
further stipulates that therapeutic efficacy is lacking
when it is established that therapeutic results cannot
be obtained with the medicinal product. There is thus
no meaningful discretion whether to suspend or revoke the marketing authorization. This must be done
when the conditions mentioned in Article 11 exist.
The reasoning of the GC and the CJEU relating to
Article 11 was different, but it was informed by a
common rationale, this being that although Article
11 was mandatory in the preceding sense, there could
well be differences of opinion as how to test for harm
or for therapeutic efficacy. This is a common problem. It is frequently the case that a regulation may
impose a mandatory obligation to achieve a particular objective, but for there to be real interpretive choices as to how those objectives should best be attained.
In such instances there is discretion not as to whether
to pursue a particular objective, but as to how the objective should best be measured or realized.
This was acknowledged by the GC and the CJEU,
although they reacted to it in different ways. The GC,

1. Sufficiently serious breach
The first relates to application of the sufficiently serious breach test. It has never been easy to prove the
conditions for damages liability against the EU, although the test has become somewhat less restrictive
than it was in the earlier years." The need to prove
the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of EU
law has always been the principal stumbling block

20
21
22
23

Case C-221/10 P, para. 104.
Case C-221/10 P, para. 108.
Case C-221/10 P, para. 109.
H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels, and P. Mead, (eds), The NonContractual Liability of the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff,
1988);T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds.), The Action for Damages in Community Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997); C. Hilson,
"The Role of Discretion in EC law on Non-Contractual Liability",
42 CMLRev (2005), p. 677 etsqq; P.Oliver, "Enforcing Community Rights in the English Courts", 50 MLR (1987), p. 881 etsqq; T.
Tridimas, "Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up
301
and Mellowing Down?", 38 CMLRev (2001), p.
et sqq.
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as we have seen, held that the earlier decisions of the
EU courts had established the breach of Article 11 of
Directive 65/65, which could not therefore be reopened in the later litigation about damages. It also
decided that this Article did not contain any meaningful discretion as to the substantive criteria for revocation or withdrawal of the authorization. The GC
nonetheless concluded that the applicant had not
proven the existence of the sufficiently serious
breach, because of the legal and factual complexity
involved in the application of the criteria in Article
11. The CJEU by way of contrast held that the earlier litigation had not established the breach of Article
11, which was not therefore res judicata for the pur
poses of the present case. It acknowledged moreover
the choices as to how the conditions concerning harm
and therapeutic efficacy might be measured. Its conclusion was that the Commission's long-term per
spective when judging this issue was a legitimate interpretation of Article 11, hence there was no breach
and a fortiori no sufficiently serious breach of that
Article.

2. Appeals, errors and alternative legal
grounds
The CJEU decided that the GC had committed errors
of law, but that its substantive conclusion would not
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be overturned because it could be sustained on the
grounds set out in the preceding analysis.
This approach has a long pedigree in the CJEU's
case law, and it is premised on sound normative ar
guments. The underlying assumption is that it would
be wasteful of time and resources if the case were to
be remitted back to the GC following annulment of
its decision, if the CJEU felt that the decision could
be upheld on different grounds. This strategy is moreover especially attractive where the CJEU has a view
as to the proper interpretation of the contested provision, since it is able to set down that interpretation
in a binding judgment, which will then be relevant
for later cases.
This is fine, provided that the applicant has the
opportunity to contest the alternative legal ground
advanced by the CJEU. The applicant's arguments before the CJEU will of course be directed towards revealing the errors that it believes to be present in the
GC's judgment. It may become aware during the
course of argument of some alternative legal argument that finds favour with the CJEU, but it may not.
The alternative ground preferred by the CJEU may
well make sense, and indeed this was so in Artegodan itself. This does not alter the point of principle
being made here, which is that other things being
equal basic precepts of due process require that par
ties have an opportunity to respond to arguments
that will be dispositive of the case.

Case Notes
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From Status to Impact, and the Role of National
Legislation: The Application of Article 34 TFEU
to a Private Certification Organisation in Fra.bo
Barend van Leeuwen*
Case C- 1711/ , Fra.boSpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV
(DVGW)- Technisch-WissenschaftlicherVerein (Judgment of 12th July 2012, nyr)

In Fra.bo, it was held by the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") that 'Article 28 EC' must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-law body, where the national legislation considers the
products certified by that body to be compliant with national law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are not certified by that
body'" (author'sheadnote).

1. Facts
Fra.bo SpA ("Fra.bo") is an Italian business which
manufactures and sells copper fittings. These copper fittings are used to connect two pieces of piping
for water or gas. They have sealing rings made of
malleable material at the ends to make them water
tight.
In Germany, the Deutsche Vereinigung des Gasund Wasserfaches eV ("DVGW") makes standards
which lay down the technical requirements with
which such copper fittings have to comply. It is an
association established under private law. German
legislation has provided that products in connection
with the supply of water can be lawfully brought on
the German market if they have a CE mark. If they
do not have a CE mark, the alternative is for products to be certified by DVGW. In fact, DVGW uses a
sub-contractor for its certification activities, for
which its own technical standards are used.
Fra.bo applied for certification of its copper fittings by DVGW in 1999. In

1
2

2000,

Fra.bo was award-

PhD Researcher in Law, European University Institute (Florence),
<barend.vanleeuwen@eui.eu>.
Now Article 34 TFEU
Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas und
Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) - TechnischWissenschaftlicher Verein
(Judgment of 12th July 2012), para 34.

ed a certificate for the duration of five years. The cer
tification assessment itself had been subcontracted
by the German laboratory which was normally used
and approved by DVGW to a non-approved Italian
laboratory. During the five-year period in which the
certificate was valid DVGW received complaints by
third parties which resulted in a re-assessment procedure, directly undertaken by the approved German
laboratory. In 2005, DVGW informed Fra.bo that its
fittings had not passed the ozone test, but that it was
free to submit its own assessment report within three
months. Fra.bo then had another assessment done
by a non-approved Italian laboratory, which found
that its fittings did pass the ozone test. However,
DVGW refused to recognise this report because it had
not been undertaken by one of its approved laboratories. As a consequence, it cancelled Fra.bo's certificate in June 2005. Therefore, Fra.bo was no longer
able to place its copper fittings on the German mar
ket.
After the cancellation of the certificate, Fra.bo
brought an action against the cancellation before the
Landgericht K6ln, which dismissed its claim. It then
appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf, which
decided to stay the proceedings to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European
Union ("CJEU"). Its main question was whether Ar
ticle 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC), which provides for
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the right to free movement of goods, was applicable
to the standardisation and certification activities of
DVGW If the answer to this question was negative,
its alternative question was whether DVGW's standardisation and certification activities constituted
"economic activity" for the purposes of Article ioi
TFEU (ex Article 81 EC).

11. Judgment
It is appropriate to start with the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak. She argued that it was
already clear from the CJEU's case law on the applicability of the free movement provisions to private
parties that it had moved to an approach based on
the effects of the rules created by collective regulators. Although the previous cases had not expressly
dealt with the free movement of goods, and it had
been argued that horizontal direct effect of the free
movement of goods had been excluded by the CJEU,
as a matter of principle it would not be right to take
a different approach to free movement of goods visa-vis the other fundamental freedoms. Given that
DVGW had obtained a position of significant power
in the certification market as a result of the German
legislation, it was virtually impossible to bring the
fittings on the market without a certificate awarded
by DVGW. This effect was reinforced by the fact that
the referring Court had found that the copper fittings
were not covered by a harmonised European technical standard, which meant that this was not a case in
which Fra.bo could obtain a CE mark. Certification
by DVGW was then the only alternative. AG Trstenjak argued that given this defacto competence to decide which products could be lawfully brought on the
market, which had been granted to DVGW by the
German legislation, its activities had to be caught by
the provision on free movement of goods.
The CJEU more or less followed the arguments of
AG Trstenjak. In a relatively short judgment it, first
of all, found that the copper fittings in question were
not covered by a harmonised European technical
standard. As such, Member States were free to adopt
their own technical standards, which would still have
to comply with the free movement of goods.
The CJEU then focussed exclusively on the applicability of Article 34 TFEU. Although DVGW was a
private law association over which the German State
did not exercise any decisive influence, this in itself

EJRR 3|2013

did not constitute a reason not to apply the free movement provisions to its activities. Therefore, the question for the CJEU to answer was whether the activities of DVGW could have "the effect of giving rise to
restrictions on the free movement of goods in the
same manner as do measures imposed by the State".'
The CJEU answered this question in the affirmative and, in reaching its conclusion, used three key
arguments.7 First of all, German legislation had provided that goods certified by DVGW would be compliant with national law and could be lawfully
brought on the market. Secondly, DVGW was the only body which certified copper fittings in Germany.
As a result, the only possibility for business to obtain
a certificate of compliance was through certification
by DVGW Thirdly, a lack of certification by DVGW
would result in serious difficulties to place products
on the German market. Almost all German consumers bought copper fittings which had been certified by DVGW
On the basis of these three arguments, the CJEU
held that "a body such as the DVGW, by virtue of its
authority to certify the products, in reality holds the
power to regulate the entry into the German market
of products such as the copper fittings at issue in the
main proceedings" and that, consequently, Article
34 TFEU was applicable to its standardisation and
certification activities. This meant that it was not necessary to answer the question on the applicability of
Article io TFEU.

Ill. Comment
It should not come as a surprise that the CJEU held
that DVGW's activities were caught by the provision
on the free movement of goods. In the past decade,
the CJEU has gradually moved from deciding the applicability of the free movement provisions on the
basis of the public or private status of the regulator
to the actual impact of the regulatory actions on the

3

4
5

6
7
8

Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-171/11, Fra.boSpA v
Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) TechnischWissenschaftlicher Verein, paras 43-45.
Ibid., paras 49-50.
Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas und
Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) - TechnischWissenschaftlicher Verein
(Judgment of 12th July 2012), paras. 18-20.
Ibid., para 26.
Ibid., paras 27-30.
Ibid., para 31.
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internal market. This approach has been taken to improve the effectiveness and uniformity of EU
law.' Public and private regulators act in the same internal market and while some of the Member States
still have public regulators, others have delegated
powers to private regulators. If Member States could
escape the application of EU law by delegating regulatory powers to private parties, this would be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the free movement provisions.
This rationale was clearlyrecognisedby AG Trstenjak and can also be seen in the judgment itself. The
move towards an effects-based application of the free
movement provisions is very clear from the structure
of the judgment. The CJEU justified the application
of the provision on the free movement of goods to
DVGW by reference to three main arguments outlined above. These arguments were provided after
the CJEU referred to the definition of a restriction of
the right to free movement of goods based on the
Dassonville formula." Traditionally, the determination of the applicability of the free movement provisions preceded the determination of a restriction. In
this case, the issue of applicability is determined on
the basis of the identification of a restriction. To put
it in simple terms, Article 34 TFEU was held applicable to DVGW because its actions constituted a restriction of the free moment of goods. Therefore, it
is clear that the free movement of goods provision
was applied to DVGW's activities because of the impact its activities had on the internal market, not because of its public or private status as regulator. It is
not entirely clear how this effects-based application
can be reconciled with the CJEU's own statement in
Fra.bothat the measures must give rise to restrictions
to the free movement of goods imposed "in the same
manner as do measures imposed by the State". 1 This
would appear to be a somewhat formalistic return to

9

10

11
12

13
14

Stefaan van den Bogaert, "Horizontality: the Court Attacks?", in
Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott, (eds.), The Law of the Single
European Market: Unpacking the Premises, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 123-152.
Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas und
Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) - TechnischWissenschaftlicher Verein
(Judgment of 12th July 2012), para 22.
Ibid., para 26.
Opinion of AG Maduro in Viking, Case C-438/05, International
Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's
UnionvViking Line ABP et al., [2007] ECR 1-10779, paras 38-40.
Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v Association Union cycliste
internationale and others, [1974] ECR 1405.
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football
Association ASBL v]ean-Marc Bosman and others, [1995] ECR I4921.
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a distinction based on whether or not measures can
be attributed to the State or are similar to measures
taken by the State.
If it is not really surprising that the free movement
provisions were held applicable to DVGW's activities, why is Fra.bostill such an interesting case? This
is because many EU lawyers were interested to find
out whether the application of the free movement
provisions to DVGW was considered to be horizontal or vertical direct effect by the CJEU. However, the
CJEU was very careful not to touch on that issue in
its judgment. One could argue that it no longer makes
sense to distinguish between horizontal and vertical
direct effect, since all what matters is the impact of
the regulatory conduct on the internal market. This
was the position taken by AG Maduro in his Opinion
in Viking." While it is correct that it does not make
any difference when deciding on the applicability of
the free movement provisions, the horizontal or ver
tical nature of the proceedings might still have an impact of the issue of responsibility or liability. If the
Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf were to find that the
activities of DVGW constituted an obstacle to Fra.bo's
right to free movement, would DVGW be required
to compensate Fra.bo itself, or would it be able to for
ward the bill directly to the German State? After all,
the effect of the German legislation was a decisive
factor in the CJEU's decision to apply the free movement provisions to DVGW
In that respect, the Fra.bo case is illustrative of a
recent series of cases in which the private regulator
to which the free movement provisions were applied
had a clear link to the State and to national legislation. Although the German State had no direct influence on the activities of DVGW, DVGW's activities
would not have had an important regulatory impact
if the German legislation had not singled out DVGW
as the main certification body in the market. As such,
this case in a way challenges the CJEU's previous rationale for extending the application of the free movement provisions to private parties. In the traditional
series of cases based on Walrave en Koch," the CJEU
focussed on two functional criteria. The first was that
the private party had to be engaged in collective regulation; the second was that it was exercising legal
autonomy. In Fra.bo, there appears to be a tension
between these two criteria. They did not cause any
difficulties in cases like Walrave en Koch or
Bosman,1 4 in which the private regulators in question, the UCI and the UEFA, were clearly powerful
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private regulators which were entirely independent
from the State. There was no link to national legislation. In Fra.bo, the collective regulation element of
DVGW's activities derived from the German legislation. The collective impact of DVGW's certification
activities would not have occurred but for the decision of the German legislature to refer to DVGW in
the legislation. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the collective regulation aspect of DVGW's activities
was much more vertical than horizontal.
However, when we look at the criterion of legal
autonomy the situation is quite different. DVGW was
acting autonomously in its adoption of the rules
which gave rise to the dispute in Fra.bo. The specif
ic rules on the ozone testing had been adopted by
DVGW itself without any State input. The same applied to its rules which provided that it would not accept reports from non-approved laboratories. In fact,
the German legislation had given something of a
"carte blanche" to DVGW to regulate according to its
own standards and rules. It did not in any way prescribe how DVGW should exercise its standardisation
and certification activities. Although the German legislation had placed DVGW in a position of regulatory power, the exercise of that regulatory power was
not controlled by the legislation. From that perspective then, the application of the free movement provision would seem to be more horizontal than vertical.
This discussion is not purely theoretical, since it
will have a real impact on the question of liability. If
private regulators are increasingly going to be held
liable under free movement law, the impact of the relationship between private regulators and the State
on the issue of liability should be further clarified by
the CJEU. This is not something which can simply be
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left to national courts, as it is a matter of EU law when
the free movement provisions should be applied to
private parties and when they should be held liable.
Further clarification of some of the concepts used by
the CJEU is required. For example, in Fra.bo, if legal
autonomy was to be the key criterion, it would be just
to hold DVGW individually and solely liable for any
breaches of free movement law. However, if the application of the free movement provisions was more
based on the collective regulation aspect, then it
would be just to hold the German State liable. This
is a question of legal certainty for national private
regulators which remains to be answered by the
CJEU. It was not adequately dealt with in Laval," in
which the CJEU failed to apply its discussion of the
interaction between the trade union's actions and the
Swedish legislation to the question of liability. As a
consequence, the Swedish Labour Court was left to
decide the issue of liability with very limited guidance.6 The outcome cannot be described as a success." Therefore, the CJEU should not simply continue to extend the application of the free movement
provisions to private parties without providing more
guidance on this issue.

15
16

17

Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggandsarbetareforbundet et al., [2007] ECR -11767.
Arbetsdomstolensdomar (Judgments by the Labour Court) 2009
No.89 of 2 Dec. 2009. Unofficial English translation by Jur. Dr
Laura Carlson, available on the Internet at <http://arbetsratt.juridicum.su.se/Filer/PDF/ErikSjoedin/AD%202009%20nr%2089%20Laval%20English.pdf> (last accessed on 6 August 2013).
Barend van Leeuwen, "An illusion of protection and an assumption of responsibility: the possibility of Swedish State liability
after Laval", in Catherine Barnard and Marcus Gehring (eds.), The
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2011-2012,
Volume 14, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), pp. 453-473. Others are more positive: Ulf Bernitz and Norbert Reich, "Case
comment: The Labour Court Judgment in the Case Laval et Partneri", 48 CML Rev (2011), pp. 603-623.
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The Product of Nature Doctrine in the Myriad
Saga II
Emanuela Gambini*

In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Association for Molecular Pathology et al.
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., holding that "a naturally occurring DNA segment is a
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA
is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring"
This case note gives an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, which isfocused
on the product of nature doctrine, and discusses its implications for the implementation
of the criterion of isolation to DNA sequences and the United States Patent and Trademark Office's long-standing practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences
(author's headnote).

1.The "Myriad Case" before the U.S.
Supreme Court

have a mutation of this gene tend to have a high incidence of breast cancer, as well as ovarian cancer. In

On June

While BRCAi affects only women and also carries
an increased risk of ovarian cancer, BRCA2 raises the
risk of breast cancer alone, and can affect both
women and men.'
Litigation started on May 12, 2009 when an as sortment of medical organizations' and a group of patients, researchers and genetic counselors working
on the prevention and cure of breast cancer sued
Myriad Genetics, the directors of the University of
Utah Research Foundation, and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). The plaintiffs challenged fifteen claims of seven patents owned or exclusively licensed to Myriad Genetics, a company involved in diagnostic testing, and asked for summa-

1995 the BRCA2 gene was mapped and sequenced.
13, 2013,

the Supreme Court of the United

States decided Associationfor MolecularPathologyet
al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al.' (the "Myriad case"),
and its holding may affect the United States Patent
and Trademark Office's (USPTO) long-standing practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences
and the implementation of the concept of isolation
in order to establish patent eligibility.
The Myriad case involves some very controversial
patents in both Europe2 and the United States on BRCAi and 2 genes, whose mutations are linked to genetic breast and ovarian cancer. The BRCAi gene,
discoveredin 1990, is a tumor suppressor gene linked
to genetic breast and ovarian cancer. Women who

1

2

Researcher in Philosophy of Law at the Catholic University of
Piacenza (Italy), Law Faculty.
See Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
569 U.S. 12-398 (2013), available on the Internet at
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 2pdf/ 12398_1 b7d.pdf> (last accessed on 14 August 2013).
See Mariachiara Tallacchini, Gene Patenting in Europe (forthcoming): "In Europe, after two patents on BRCA1 (Patents EP0699754
and EP0705902) were granted by the EPO in January and November 2001, Switzerland's Social Democratic Party, Greenpeace
Germany, the French Institute Curie, Assistance Publique-Hopitaux de Paris, the Belgian Society of Human Genetics, the Netherlands, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Social Security et al. filed
an opposition with the support of the European Parliament.

3

4

Opponents argued that both inventions lacked novelty, inventive
step and industrial application and posed ethical and policy
concerns. One of the patents was revoked and the other was
amended. After Myriad's appeal and opposition they were restored, but in an amended form".
G. De Wert, R. Ter Meulen, R. Mordacci and M. Tallacchini,
Ethics and Genetics. A Workbook for Practitioners and Students
(Oxford-New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). On the discovery of
BRCA1 and 2 genes see also S. Parthasarathy, Building Genetic
Medicine. Breast Cancer, Technology, and the Comparative Politics
of Health Care (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2007), at pp. 3-7.
(1) The Association of Molecular Pathology (AMP); (2) The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG); (3) The American
Society for Clinical Pathology (ASCP); (4) The College of American Pathologists (CAP).
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ry judgment on their invalidity. These claims fall into two main categories: product claims' and method
claims.'
The public debate raised by these patents focuses
on whether the claims are patentable subject matter
according to Title 35 %101 U.S.C.,' since they include
the so-called "wild type" sequences, namely DNA sequences not altered and mutated.' These sequences
are the basis for performing any kind of clinical genetic predisposition test for breast and ovarian cancer, in order to establish the actual existence of mutations in the BRCAi and 2 genes of individuals.
The claims have been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. According to the plaintiffs the
claims fall within the judicial patentability exclusion
affirmed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty0 on the laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Fur
thermore, they infringe the First Amend
ment,'' which deals with liberty of expression and
association, and Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution.1 2
Myriad was accused of having pursued, since the
'90s, a commercial strategy aimed at gaining a monopoly on BRCAi and 2 mutations testing:
1. Myriad patented several BRCAi and 2 sequences,
as well as the methods to compare them.
2. Then it enforced its patents and exclusive licenses against other researchers, clinicians and laboratories offering similar services, by sending cease

5

6

7

8

9

The "product category" includes: (a) Claims that cover the isolated BRCA genes (claim 1 of the '282 patent, claim 1 of the '473
patent, and claims 1 and 6 of the '492 patent); (b)Claims that
cover only the BRCA cDNA (claims 2 and 7 of the '282 patent
and claim 7 of the '492 patent); (c) Claims that cover portions of
the BRCA genes and cDNA as small as 15 nucleotides long
(claims 5 and 6 of the '282 patent).
The "method category" encompasses method claims directed at
comparing or analyzing a patient's altered BRCA sequence with
the normal one or wild-type one to identify the presence of
cancer-predisposing mutations (e.g. claim 1 of the '999 and '001
patents).
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 Inventions patentable, available on the
Internet at
<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/us/us007en.pdf> (last
accessed on 14 August 2013).
Plaintiffs point out claims 1, 2, 5 and 6 of "patent '282"; claim 1
of "patent '492". SeeAssociation for Molecular Pathology et al. v
United States Patent and Trademark Office et al., Complaint, 12
May 2009, available on the Internet at <http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv04515/345544/1/0.pdf?ts=1243609964> (last ac20
cessed on 14 August 2013), at pp. -21.
Scientists often use the term "wild-type" to refer to the normal
gene sequence, i.e. the sequence of a gene without any variation,
against which individuals' gene sequences are compared. Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and
Trademark Office et al., Case 1:09-cv-04515-RWS, 29 March
2010, available on the Internet <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100329_patent-opin-
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and desist letters and proposing collaboration licenses.
This monopolistic strategy was considered to have
hindered clinical research on cancer, limited the per
formance of alternative/complementary clinical diagnostic tests for hereditary cancer predisposition,
raised considerably the health insurance costs related to BRCAi and 2 mutations testing and restrained
access to health care for patients.
The District Court granted summary judgment to
the petitioners on the composition claims and concluded that Myriad's claims, including the ones related to cDNA," were invalid since they covered products of nature.
On July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held valid most of Myriad's patents on
BRCAi and 2 genes, reaffirming the USPTO's longstanding practice of granting patents on isolated
DNA sequences. On the merits, the Court reversed
the District Court's decision that Myriad's composition claims to "isolated" DNA molecules cover patentineligible products of nature under Title 35 %101
U.S.C. since the molecules, as claimed, do not exist
in nature. It reversed the decision that Myriad's
method claim to screening potential cancer therapeutics via changes in cell growth rates is directed to a
patent-ineligible scientific principle. It, however, af
firmed the decision that methods claims directed to

10
11

12

13

ion.pdf?scp=3&sq Myriad%2OGenetics&st-cse> (last accessed
on 14 August 2013), at p. 31. However, Senior Judge Sweet
points out that "there is an increasing recognition that the notion
of a single 'normal' gene sequence may not be entirely accurate
in light of the high frequency of variations in a gene sequence
between individuals". See note 8, Association for Molecular
Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark Office et
al., 29 March 2010, at p. 31.
U.S. Supreme Court, Diamond v Chakrabarty (447 U.S. 303), 16
June 1980, the "Chakrabarty case".
On the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution see A. Roddey
Holder and J.T. Roddey Holder, The Meaning of the Constitution
(NY Hauppauge: Barron's, 1997), at p. 57.
Art. 1,section 8, clause 8 states: "The Congress shall have the
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries". See A.
Roddey Holder and J.T. Roddey Holder, The Meaning of the
Constitution, supra note 11, at p. 28.
cDNA or complementary DNA is "a man-made copy of the
coding sequences of a gene; cDNA is produced in a test tube - it
is not a natural product. In a living cell, the protein-coding
sequences of DNA are transcribed as mRNA. Molecular biologists
use reverse transcriptase, an enzyme that makes DNA copies
from RNA, to make copies of the mRNA. The resulting cDNA - a
copy of a copy, so to speak - may then be analyzed by various
methods". See Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood (eds.), The Code
of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome
Project (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), at
p. 376.
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comparing or analyzing DNA sequences are not
patent-eligible because such claims cover only abstract mental steps.1 4
On March 26, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on the
case." This decision vacated the judgment of appeal
and remanded the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further consider
ation in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v.
PrometheusLaboratories,Inc. (the "Mayo case"). 1 6 In
the Mayo case the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, held
invalid several patent claims, which concerned the
use of thiopurine drugs to treat certain autoimmune
diseases. The patented processes were not considered
patent eligible as they claimed laws of nature, namely the correlations between thiopurine metabolite
levels and the toxicity or efficacy of thiopurine drug
dosages.
On remand, on August 16, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in part and reversed
in part, with each member of the panel writing separately. The Court agreed that only one petitioner, Dr.
Ostrer, had standing." On the merits, it held that
both isolated DNA and cDNA sequences were patent
eligible under %101." The Court reversed the District
Court's holding that Myriad's method claim to screening potential cancer therapeutics via changes in cell
growth rates of transformed cells is directed to a
patent-ineligible scientific principle and affirmed
that Myriad's method claims directed to comparing
or analyzing DNA sequences are patent-ineligible."

The central issue discussed by the panel members
was whether the act of isolating a DNA sequence, separating a sequence of nucleotides from the rest of the
chromosome, is an inventive act that entitles the per
son who first did it to a patent or not. Each member
of the panel had a different point of view on the question. While Judges Lourie and Moore agreed that
Myriad's DNA sequences were patent-eligible, but
disagreed on the rationale, Judge Bryson dissented
in part and argued that isolated DNA is not patenteligible.

14

20 See In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., on
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 25
September 2012, available on the Internet at <http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/12 -398- Petition.pdf>
(last accessed on 14 August 2013), at p. i.
21 See In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., on
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 20, at p. i: "2. Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding a method claim by Myriad that is irreconcilable with this
Court's ruling in Mayo Collaborative Servs. vPrometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) 3. Did the Court of Appeals err in
adopting a new and inflexible rule, contrary to normal standing
rules and this Court's decision in Med/mmune, Inc. v Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), that petitioners who have been indisputably deterred by Myriad's "active enforcement" of its patent
rights nonetheless lack standing to challenge those patents absent
evidence that they have been personally threatened with an
infringement action?"
22 Mayo Collaborative Services, Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 20 March 2012, supra note 16, at
p. 3, citing Benson, 409 U. S.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 29 July 2011, available on the Internet at
<http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 10-1406.pdf> (last accessed on
14 August 2013), at p. 8.
See U.S. Supreme Court Order 11-725, 26 March 2012, available on the Internet at <http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/03261 2zor.pdf> (last accessed on 14 August
2013).
U.S. Supreme Court, Mayo Collaborative Services, Mayo Medical
Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 20 March
2012, 566 U.S. (2012), available on the Internet at
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 11 pdf/ 10-11 50.pdf> (last
accessed on 15 July 2013).
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, available on the Internet at
<http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/ 101406.pdf> (last accessed on 14 August 2013), at p. 7.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, supra note 17, at pp. 7-8.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, supra note 17, at p. 8.

11. The product of nature doctrine
applied to isolated DNA sequences
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted
again petition for a writ of certiorari on the Myriad
case, but limited it to one question presented by petitioners - "Are human genes patentable?" - 2 and
dismissed the other two, which concerned Myriad's
method claims and petitioners' standing.2 ' The
Court's judgment of June 13, 2013 has, therefore,
dealt only with patent eligibility of DNA sequences
and focused on whether they are patentable subject
matter, according to Title 35 %i0i U.S.C., or fall within one of the implicit exceptions to this provision established for laws of nature, natural phenomena and
abstract ideas. The rationale of these exceptions to
patentability is that they represent "the basic tools
of scientific and technological work"22 that lie beyond
the domain of patent protection. The first two excep-
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tions/exclusions to patentable subject matter, which
regard the laws of nature and natural phenomena,
result from the so-called product of nature doctrine,
which can be traced back to the XIX century and was
re-affirmed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty." According
to it, the laws of nature and natural phenomena are
excluded from patent protection, whereas a non-natural occurring manufacture or composition of matter - a product of human ingenuity - is patent-eligible. In order to assess whether this doctrine could be
applied to Myriad's composition claims on DNAs sequences, the Court examined what Myriad's invention consisted of and concluded that "Myriad's principal contribution was uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCAi and BRCA2
genes within chromosomes 17 and 13"1.24 Confronting Myriad's gene claims with Chakrabarty's invention, it observed that Chakrabarty's bacterium
was new, "with markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature", whereas "Myriad did not
create anything ... it found an important and useful
gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding
genetic materials is not an act of invention".Justice
Thomas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, ar
gued that although isolating DNA from the human
genome severs chemical bonds, Myriad's claims were
not expressed in terms of chemical composition nor
did they rely in any way on the chemical changes
that result from isolation of a particular section of
DNA.
The Judge pointed out that the claims, instead, focused on the genetic information encoded in the BRCAi and 2 genes2 ' because it is the genetic information that is valuable for Myriad. As a matter of fact,
"if the patents depended upon the creation of a
unique molecule, then a would be infringer could ar
guably avoid at least Myriad's patent claims on entire genes ... by isolating a DNA sequence that included both the BRCAi or BRCA2 gene and one additional nucleotide pair". Since such a molecule would not
be chemically identical to the molecule invented by
Myriad, there would not be any patent infringement.
However, as the Court argued, Myriad would resist
that outcome, since its claims are concerned primar
ily with the information in the genetic sequence, not
with the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule.
The Court, therefore, concluded unanimously that
"genes and the information they encode are not
patent eligible under % o1 simply because they have
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been isolated from the surrounding genetic material".This holding may have significant consequences
on the USPTO long-standing practice of granting
patents on isolated DNA sequences because, for the
first time, the Supreme Court made clear that extensive research effort and the mere isolation of DNA
sequences are insufficient to satisfy the demands of
%101.

The Court, however, deemed cDNA patent eligible
under %1o1 since it is not naturally occurring. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained2 DNA molecules can be also synthesized in
the laboratory and one type of synthetic DNA molecule is complementary DNA or cDNA. cDNA is synthesized from mRNA using complementary base
pairing in a manner analogous to RNA transcription.
Because it is synthesizedfrom mRNA, cDNA contains
only the exon sequences (the coding regions for proteins) and none of the intron sequences (the non-coding regions) from a chromosomal gene sequence. The
creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in
an exons-only molecule that does not exist in nature.
Therefore, cDNA sequences were considered patenteligible.

Ill. Comment
As regards DNA sequences, isolation and purification
are scientific concepts that have acquired legal relevance in patent systems to distinguish nonpatentable sequences from patentable ones.2 9 In the

23
24

25

26

27

28

29

U.S. Supreme Court, Diamond v Chakrabarty, 16 Junel 980,
supra note 10.
See Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at p. 12.
See Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at p. 12.
See Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at pp. 14-15.
Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular
Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at p. 18.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, supra note 17, at pp. 16-17.
In the European Union the criteria of isolation and purification
were introduced (art. 5.2) with the approval of the European
Parliament and Council Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, available on the Internet at
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1 998:213:0013:0021 :EN:PDF> (last accessed on 30 July 2013).
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United States the introduction 0 into the USPTO's revised Utility Examination Guidelines" of 20012 of
the criteria of isolation and purification has established the rationale to legally demarcate between naturally occurring DNA sequences and artificially isolated/purified ones. According to the Guidelines, "an
isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same
sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for
a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a
patent as a composition of matter or as an article of
manufacture because that DNA molecule does not
occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because
their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound". The inclusion of these criteria in
the USPTO's Utility Examination Guidelines has supported DNA sequences patentability, reducing the
risks for DNA patent holders to incur the "product of
nature" doctrine's objections."
Although the meanings of "isolation" and "purification" seem to be clear, the Myriad case has instead
shown all the ambiguities related to their practical
implementation. Genes, as Judge Sweet pointed out,
are of a double-nature: on one hand, they are chemical substances or molecules and, on the other, they
are carriers of information. In the Myriad case the

former viewpoint had to face the latter,3 4 according
to which "DNA represents the physical embodiment
of biological information, distinct in its essential
characteristics from any other chemical found in nature"." If the latter is considered more scientifically
and legally sound in describing the very nature of
DNA sequences, it can be concluded that isolated
DNA molecules fall within the "product of nature"" exception under 35 U.S.C. %io because such
isolated DNAs are not "markedly different" from native DNAs."
The judges who decided the Myriad case expressed
opposing views about what is DNA (a chemical molecule or information), whether it is better described
by its structure or its function and what the criterion
of isolation means within each of these different
frames. For instance, Judge Lourie of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that the process of
excising a selected portion of DNA from its cellular
environment results in a molecule that is structural
ly different from native DNA, since each end of the
isolated DNA segment is no longer bonded to the rest
of the gene. According to him, the fact that "isolated
DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its
backbone chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA

30

that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature,
or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because
their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound" (USPTO, January 5, 2001, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg., at p. 1092).
33 The origin of the "product of nature" doctrine can be traced back
to the XIX century, at least in 1889 when Exparte Latimer
[Commn. Dec. 123(1889)] was decided by the Commissioner of
patents. See J.Wilson, "Patenting Organisms. Intellectual Property
Law Meets Biology", in D. Magnus, A. Caplan, G. McGee (eds.)
Who Owns Life? (Amherst NY: Prometheus Books, 2002) at
47
pp.
-48. For a critical historical reconstruction of the "product
of nature" doctrine, see L.J. Demaine and A.X. Fellmeth, "Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent", in 55 Stanford Law Review
(2002), at pp. 303-462.
34 See L.E.Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life? A History of the
Genetic Code (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
35 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and
Trademark Office et al., 29 March 2010, available on the Internet
at <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100329_patent opinion.pdf?scp=3&sq Myriad%2oGenetics&st-cse> (last accessed on 14 August 2013), at pp. 7-8.
36 The main substantive argument advanced by the plaintiffs and
agreed on by Judge Sweet is based on the "product of nature
doctrine". See U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States
Patent and Trademark Office et al., Complaint, supra note 8, at
p. 18.
37 See U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent
and Trademark Office et al., 29 March 2010, supra note 35, at
p. 8.
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As the U.S. Department of Justice explained in its brief for the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, in 2001
the USPTO issued its first written explanation of its practice of
granting patents for isolated DNA molecules. In response to comments concerning proposed revisions to its Utility Examination
Guidelines (66 Fed. Reg. 1092, January 5, 2001), the PTO held
that an isolated DNA molecule is not a product of nature "because
that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature". See In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association
for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief
of the United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party,
31 January 2013, available on the Internet at <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supremecourt preview/briefs-v2/12-398 neither amcu us.authcheckdam.pdf> (last
27
accessed on 14 August 2013), at pp.
-28.
In 2001 the USPTO published a revised version of the Utility
Examination Guidelines to be used by office personnel in their
review of patent applications for compliance with the 'utility'
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, that became effective on January
5, 2001. See USPTO, <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2001 /weekO5/patutil.htm> (last accessed on 14
August 2013).
After the controversial granting in the '90s of some patents on the
so-called ESTs(expressed sequence tags), in 2001 the USPTO had
to enact new Utility Examination Guidelines to stem the "far-west
patent rush" to DNA sequences (see M.A. Heller and R.S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research", Science, 1 May 1998, Vol. 280, at p. 699). In
the Guidelines were set forth the concepts of isolation and purification to discriminate non-patentable DNA sequences from
patentable ones: "An isolated and purified DNA molecule that
has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible
for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as
a composition of matter or as an article of manufacture because
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molecule"" makes it "markedly different" from native
DNA. Furthermore, he embraced a structural description of DNA sequences, pointing out that although
"biologists may think of molecules in terms of their
uses, genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by their
structures rather than by their functions"."
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the
view that genes carry information and it is their information that makes them valuable for patent pur
poses. Like the U.S. Department of Justice, which
wrote a brief for the United States as amicus curiae
in support of neither party, the Court considered the
structural difference between isolated DNA and native DNA (namely the isolated segment's "snipped"
ends) with no functional consequences, as the truncation does not alter the operative properties of the
isolated DNA segment.4 0 This perspective is focused
on the function that DNA performs in the human
body and in a laboratory. If the function performed
is the same and the "additional utility" that isolation
adds is simply the ability of researchers to study and
exploit in a laboratory the inherent natural proper
ties that isolated DNA shares with native DNA, isolated DNA sequences will not be patent eligible, according to the brief.4 1
The word "isolation" generally refers to "separating a specific gene or sequence of nucleotides from
the rest of the chromosome".4 2 However, in order to
establish patent eligibility of a specific isolated DNA
sequence, the patent examiner must ascertain
whether isolation makes the sequence "markedly dif
ferent" from the one found in nature or not. The US PTO issued patents on isolated DNA sequences for
more than twenty years. This practice, as the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New
York pointed out, was based on the analogy between
DNA sequences and chemical compounds.43 Nonetheless, if this view, grounded on the chemical analogy, is questioned, the boundaries between naturally occurring products and man-made inventions may
change.
Although, according to Myriad, the USPTO's past
practice of awarding gene patents should be entitled
to deference by the courts, the Supreme Court disagreed, recalling the Department of Justice's brief.
The brief made clear that the USPTO's revised Utility Examination Guidelines do not have the force of
the law and do not specifically address patents on
DNA, but were revised to fix a standard for determining utility generally.4 4 Moreover, Congress has never
specifically considered the USPTO's practice of
granting patents on isolated DNA in its bills related
to patents on genetic materials.45 The correctness of
the USPTO's practice was never challenged in litigation prior to the Myriad case, but the Supreme Court
designed an opposite frame to describe the "nature"
of genes, centred on their biological information and
function. Within this frame, in order to assess gene
patent eligibility, the concept of isolation entails
more than extensive research and economical investments to achieve the separation of a DNA sequence
from the rest of the chromosome. 46 This choice in favor of defining genes by their informational character and function may, therefore, affect the application of the criteria of isolation in the future and bring
about a substantial change in the USPTO's practice
of granting patents on native DNA sequences.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court was guided by the consideration that "patent protection
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Eisenberg explained why the chemical analogy was applied to
genes in such a successful way. R.S.Eisenberg, "Why Gene
Patenting Controversy Persists", 77 Academic Medicine (2002), at
p. 1381; R.S. Eisenberg, "Patenting Genome Research Tools and
the Law", 326 Comptes Rendus Biologies (2003), at p. 1116.
44 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief of the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, supra
note 30, at p. 28.
45 See, for example, Genomic Science and Technology Innovation
Act of 2002 (H.R. 3966, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., 2002); Genomic
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (H.R. 3967,
107th Cong., 2d Sess., 2002); Life Patenting Moratorium Act of
1993 (S.387, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 1993); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118
Stat. 101).
46 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief of the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, 31
January 2013, supra note 30, at p. 28.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, supra note 17, at p. 45.
39 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Association for
Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark
Office et al., 16 August 2012, supra note 17, at p. 48.
40 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief of the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, 31
January 2013, supra note 30, at p. 22.
41 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief of the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, 31
January 2013, supra note 30, at p. 23.
42 Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular
Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at p. 8.
43 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and
Trademark Office et al., 29 March 2010, supra note 35, at p. 7.
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strikes a delicate balance between creating 'incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery'
and 'imped[ing] the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention"'.4 7 As the Department of Justice noted, "an overbroad conception of
patent eligibility under %io can impose significant
social costs by requiring the public to pay to study
and exploit that which ought to be 'free to all men
and reserved to none"'. 8 The product of nature doctrine exceptions to io reflect the public interest
in avoiding undue restrictions imposed by patents
that could preempt natural laws and substances. Unlike the USPTO's long-standing practice, the
Supreme Court struck a different balance of the opposite interests involved in patenting DNA sequences: access to genetic information by scientific
researchers and clinicians, patients' health care
rights and intellectual property rights held by
biotech companies.

IV. In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision
On June 14, 2013, the day after the Supreme Court's
decision was issued, Myriad's stock fell by 5.6%, and
it became clear to analysts that, even though the company was partially successful before the Court, its
market share in the genetic testing on BRCAi and 2
genes was expected to decrease.4 9
Shortly afterwards, Myriad Genetics, Inc., together with the University of Utah Research Foundation,

47 Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular
Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 13 June 2013,
supra note 1, at p. 11.
48 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., Brief of the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, 31
January 2013, supra note 30, at p. 33.
49 See Johanna Bennett, "About Face on Myriad Genetics, Stock
Falls 5.6%", available on the Internet at <http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/06/13/about-face-on-myriadgenetics-stock-falls-5-6/> (last accessed on 30 July 2013).
50 In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al., v Gene
by Gene LTD, Complaint Demand for Jury Trial, 10 July 2013,
available on the Internet at <http://files.priorsmart.com.s3.amazonaws.com/utdce/89792/Complaint.pdf?Signature=7Cgxhnu5QIu%2FgM7jCmSRghLXeZ%3D&Expires=1375782713&AWSAccessKeyld=AKIAJWOP3U6XRH5BBMOA> (last accessed on 31
July 2013).
51 In the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et
al., v Ambry Genetics Corporation, Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support, 9 July 2013,
available on the Internet at <http://www.patentlyo.com/myriad-
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the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, HSC
Research and Development Limited Partnership and
Endorecherche Inc. filed a complaint for patent infringement and a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive
Relief against two competitors, Gene by Gene
Ltdso and Ambry Genetics Corporation," which announced that they would offer genetic testing on BRCAi and 2 genes at a much lower price than Myriad
had offered before the decision. As Myriad made
clear in the Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
and Memorandum in Support against Defendant
Ambry Genetics, 2 before the Supreme Court's ruling
on June 13, 2013, Myriad held 24 patents containing
520 claims concerning BRCAi and 2 genes. After the
Court held that five patent claims covering isolated
naturally occurring DNA were not patent-eligible,
Myriad's patent estate was reduced to 24 patents and
515 patent claims. Nonetheless, these two cases do
not involve any of those five rejected claims," but
only methods-of use and synthetic DNA patent
claims concerning BRCAi and 2 genes, which are
valid and, therefore, enforceable.
As regards the first civil action, Myriad complained that Gene by Gene infringed and induced the
infringement of, literally and/or under the doctrine
of equivalents, several claims related to nine
patents,5 4 owned or exclusively licensed to Myriad
and asked for damages. Gene by Gene began, in fact,
offering its BRCA 1 and 2 analysis and clinical diagnostic and genomic services as part of its testing
menu as soon as the Court's opinion was issued, on
June
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13, 2013.s

motionforpreliminaryrelief.pdf> (last accessed on 31 July 2013),
at p. 4.
See In the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al.,
v Ambry Genetics Corporation, Motion for Preliminary Injunctive
Relief and Memorandum in Support, 9 July 2013, supra note 51,
at p. 4.
See In the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al.,
v Ambry Genetics Corporation, Motion for Preliminary Injunctive
Relief and Memorandum in Support, 9 July 2013, supra note 51,
at p. 4.
Myriad alleged that Gene by Gene was infringing the following
patents, owned or exclusively licensed to Myriad: U.S. patent
No. 5,709,999 (the "'999 Patent"); U.S. patent No. 5,747,282 (the
"'282 Patent"); U.S. patent No. 5,753,441 (the "'441 Patent");
U.S. patent No. 5,837,492 (the "'492 Patent"); U.S. patent
No. 6,033,857 (the "'857 Patent"); U.S. patent No. 5,654,155 (the
"'155 Patent"); U.S. patent No. 5,750,400 (the "'400 Patent");
U.S. patent No. 6,951,721 (the "'721 Patent"); U.S. patent
No. 7,250,497 (the "'497 Patent).
In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al., v Gene
by Gene LTD, Complaint Demand for Jury Trial, 10 July 2013,
supra note 50, at p. 4.
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Furthermore, on July 9, 2013, Myriad filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief against Ambry
Genetics, claiming that it could suffer immediate and
irreparable harm if Ambry was not enjoined from infringing the activity of Myriad's patents. 6 Such harm
consists of "price erosion and the loss of the benefit
of Myriad's established pricing strategy; the loss of
market share; reputational injury; and loss of the benefit of the remaining limited term of patent exclusivity and Myriad's patent business plans for that period"." Myriad asserted that it had created and nurtured
to maturity a new market for clinical diagnostic testing for hereditary cancer predisposition." Allowing
Ambry to offer its BRCAPlus test for $2,280, whilst
Myriad's competing test is priced at $4,040, would

cause a decline in market prices for Myriad, since
third party payers, such as insurers and/or Health
Maintenance Organizations, would exert pressure on
the company to lower its prices in response to Ambry. In addition, other competitors could potentially
enter the market and, therefore, Myriad's market
share would drop. As a consequence, Myriad argued,
the overall quality of tests on BRCAi and 2 would decrease, as the company contends that its tests are more
reliable and accurate than Ambry's products.
By filing lawsuits against Gene by Gene and Ambry Genetics shortly after the Supreme Court's decision, Myriad sent a clear signal to potential competitors that, although the Court's ruling has potentially
weakened its market advantage of being the only
provider of tests on BRCAi and 2 genes, the company is willing to fight any attempt to threaten its monopolistic market share over clinical diagnostic testing for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer predisposition. However, the reason why Myriad's patents
became so controversial in the United States is that
they are at the core of a monopolistic strategy that
was considered to hinder clinical research on breast
and ovarian cancer, raising health insurance costs related to BRCAi and 2 mutations testing and restraining access to health care for patients. All these issues,
which were raised by the plaintiffs in the Myriad
case, involve public interests that had to confront
Myriad's patent claims and its substantial investment
towards developing genetic diagnostic testing. Not
only is Myriad the owner of many patents related to
BRCAi and 2 genes, but it is also the exclusive licensee of others," which are owned or co-owned by
universities and are partially based on federally-funded research. Some of these exclusive licenses, togeth-
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er with several patents granted to Myriad, were challenged in the Myriad case and are at present enforced
against Gene by Gene and Ambry.
Since the 198os the U.S. Congress has backed a
policy to promote the utilization of federally-sponsored inventions with the passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act 0 and the Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act." The goal of this legislation was to transform universities into major, active patent claimants
for federally funded research, so that they could attract private investors that could transform their discoveries into commercial products and would become the exclusive licensees of their patents. In more
than 20 years U.S. universities have taken the oppor
tunities opened by this legislation and filed patent
applications on basic research discoveries, such as
DNA sequences and protein structures. Although this
policy has largely fostered investments in biomedical research and favored impressive scientific results, in the long run it has entailed some problems,
namely hindering subsequent research and limiting
patients' access to health care, as the Myriad case and
its aftermath show.
Addressing one of these issues, on July 12, 2013,
U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont sent a letter
to the Director of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), Francis Collins, urging him to consider exer
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Myriad alleged that Ambry Genetics is infringing: claims 16 and
17 of patent '282, claims 29 and 30 of patent '492, claims 8 and
7 of patent '441, claim 4 of patent '857, claim 5 of patent '721,
claims 2 and 4 of patent '155. See In the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, University of Utah
Research Foundation, et al., v Ambry Genetics Corporation,
Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in
Support, 9 July 2013, supra note 51, at p. 15.
In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al., v Ambry Genetics Corporation, supra note 51, at p. 30.
In the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al., v Ambry Genetics Corporation, supra note 51, at p. 3.
For example, U.S. patent No. 5,747,282 (the "'282 Patent"),
which is owned by the University of Utah, along with the Public
Health Service, through the National Institutes of Health and is
exclusively licensed to Myriad; U.S. patent No. 5,753,441 (the
"'441 Patent"), which is owned by the University of Utah and
Public Health Service and exclusively licensed to Myriad. See In
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, University of Utah Research Foundation, et al., v Gene
by Gene LTD, Complaint Demand for Jury Trial, 10 July 2013,
supra note 50, at pp. 6-7.
The Bayh-Dole Act was passed in December 1980 (Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-516, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015,
3019-3028, 1980, codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212,
1994). Its main purpose is "to use the patent system to promote
the utilization of inventions arising from federally funded research
or development ... ". See 35 U.S.C. § 200.
The Stevenson -Wydler Technology Innovation Act was passed in
1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-480, § 2, 94 Stat. 2311-2320, 1980, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714, 2000).
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cising "march-in" rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to
ensure greater access to genetic testing for breast and
ovarian cancer." As several patents held by Myriad
are based in part on federally funded research, they
are subject to the Bayh-Dole Act's provisions. Under
the Bayh-Dole Act, federal agencies, such as the NIH,
can exercise march-in rights ex post to compel licensing of patents on inventions made through federally funded research. The federal agency can take this
initiative only in some circumstances, such as when
the "action is necessary to alleviate health or safety
needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees"."
Senator Leahy highlighted the importance of
Myriad's genetic test for public health and the fact
that the company is its only provider, because it is
covered by patent protection, and charges between
$3,000 and $4,000. Since, by exercising march-in

rights, the NIH can require the patent holder to grant
a license on reasonable terms (that can be non-exclusive, partially exclusive or exclusive), Senator Leahy
claims that this initiative would meet the health
needs of the public who cannot afford the testing provided by Myriad.
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See Senator Patrick Leahy's Letter addressed to Doctor Francis S.
Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, available on
the Internet at <http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/07-12-13pjl-to-nih-re_-myriad-march-in> (last accessed on 14 August
2013), at p. 1.
63 See 35 U.S.C. § 203 March-in rights, available on the Internet at
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title35/pdf/USCODE-2011 -title35-partil chapl 8-sec203.pdf> (last accessed on
14 August 2013).
64 Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine", in James Boyle (ed.), Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 66: 2003, Nos. 1 & 2, at pp. 289314.
65 Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine", supra note 64, at pp. 289.
66 See Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine", supra note 64, at pp. 290-291.
67 See Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine", supra note 64, at p. 294.
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As early as 2003 Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg," discussing the Bayh-Dole's reform and the
progress of biomedicine, pointed out that biomedical
tradition of open science has been eroded consider
ably over the past decades, since "proprietary claims
have reached farther upstream from end products to
cover fundamental discoveries that provide the
knowledge base for future product development",6 and that this change is partially due to the
narrowing of the conceptual gap between fundamental research and commercial application. According
to them, the changes in the economic structure of research and in the case law, that adopted an expansive
approach to patent eligibility while relaxing the standards for patent protection, such as utility and nonobviousness, may sometimes, in the long run, hinder
rather than accelerate biomedical research.6 6
As a response to the problems arising from the
frenzy of patent claims on upstream research tools,
they envisaged a set of solutions, which included the
reinvigoration of the product of nature limitation on
patent eligibility, so that discoveries of DNA sequences and proteins could be excluded from patent
protection, and to fortify the utility standard to limit the patenting of broadly enabling research tools.
In addition, they argued that march-in rights could
be used by agencies to better assure the public inter
est in federally funded patented inventions, but the
administrative hurdles are so cumbersome that the
NIH has never exercised these rights.
In the Myriad case, the Supreme Court has already
intervened decisively, reinvigorating the product of
nature doctrine and reshaping the criterion of isolation. However, since citizens'health interests at stake
are so relevant, maybe for the first time the NIH
would actually exercise march-in rights in order to
serve and fulfill the public interest involved in federally funded inventions.

